É gravíssimo, a meu ver. E tem a ver - a meu ver - com a reação do mundo hierárquico diante da emergência dos Highly Connected Worlds.
O download do relatório pode ser feito no link abaixo:
As tabelas podem ser vistas no texto acima e também no incrustado do Slideshare (no final deste post).
Uma nota em português
Vejam a situação do mundo-2010 segundo o relatório.
Democracias plenas | Países nos quais as liberdades políticas e as liberdades civis básicas são não apenas respeitadas mas tendem a ser sustentadas por um cultura política favorável ao florescimento da democracia. O funcionamento do governo é satisfatório. Os meios de comunicação são independentes ediversificados. Existe um sistema eficaz de freios e contrapesos (checks and balances). O poder judiciário é independente e as decisões judiciais são cumpridas. Os problemas no funcionamento da democracia são limitados.
Democracias plenas (full democracies) são apenas 26 países, correspondendo a 12,3% da população mundial. As consideradas full democracies são 26: Norway, Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, New Zealand, Australia, Finland, Switzerland, Canada, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Ireland, Austria, Germany, Malta, Czech Republic, US, Spain, UK, South Korea, Uruguay, Japan, Belgium, Mauritius, Costa Rica, Portugal.
Democracias defeituosas ou com falhas (flawed democracies) | Países com eleições livres e justas. Mesmo quando há problemas (como violações da liberdade de imprensa) as liberdades civis básicas são respeitadas. No entanto, existem lacunas significativas em outros aspectos da democracia, incluindo problemas de governança, cultura política subdesenvolvida e baixos níveis de participação política.
Democracias defeituosas ou com falhas (flawed democracies) são 53 países, correspondendo a 37,2% da população mundial. Cape Verde, Greece, Italy, South Africa, France, Slovenia, Estonia, Chile, Botswana, Taiwan, Israel, Slovakia, Cyprus, India, Lithuania, Timor-Leste, Hungary, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Panama, Brazil, Poland, Latvia, Mexico, Argentina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Suriname, Sri Lanka, Romania, Colombia, Thailand, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, El Salvador, Paraguay, Peru, Mongolia, Serbia, Moldova, Ukraine, Montenegro, Namibia, Dominican Republic, Malaysia, Benin, Macedonia, Philippines, Guyana, Guatemala, Lesotho, Ghana, Mali.
Regimes híbridos | As eleições apresentam irregularidades substanciais que muitas vezes as impedem de ser livres e justas. Pode ser comum a pressão do governo sobre os partidos de oposição e seus candidatos. Deficiências graves são mais frequentes do que nas democracias defeituosas - na cultura política, no funcionamento do governo e na participação política. A corrupção tende a ser generalizada e o Estado de Direito é fraco. A sociedade civil é fraca. Normalmente há perseguição e pressão sobre jornalistas e o sistema judiciário não é independente.
Regimes híbridos são 33 países, correspondendo a 14% da população mundial. Hong Kong, Bolivia, Singapore, Bangladesh, Albania, Malawi, Lebanon, Ecuardor, Honduras, Turkey, Nicaragua, Zambia, Tanzania, Palestine, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Senegal, Venezuela, Libéria, Uganda, Mozambique, Cambodia, Kenya, Bhutan, Georgia, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Kyrgyz Republic, Russia, Nepal, Armenia, Burundi, Haiti, Iraq.
Regimes autoritários | Nesses estados o pluralismo político é ausente ou muito circunscrito. Muitos países nesta categoria são ditaduras definitivas. Algumas instituições formais da democracia podem até existir, mas têm pouca substância. Eleições, se ocorrerem, não são livres e justas. Abusos e violações das liberdades civis não são considerados crimes. Maios de comunicação são estatais ou controlados por grupos no poder ligados ao regime. A crítica ao governo é reprimida e a censura é generalizada. Não há nenhum sistema judiciário independente.
Regimes autoritários são 55 países, correspondendo a 36,5% da população mundial. Madagascar, Kuwait, Mauriania, Morocco, Jordan, Ethiopia, Fiji, Burkina Faso, Cuba, Bahrain, Nigeria, Togo, Algeria, Cameroon, Comoros, Niger, Gambia, Belarus, Angola, Kazakhstan, Gabon, Rwanda, Azerbaijan, China, Qatar, Egypt. Côte d'Ivoire, Vietnam, Swaziland, Congo (Brazzaville), Oman, Guinea, Tunisia, Zimbabwe, Yemen, UAE, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Sudan, Eritrea, Syria, Djibouti, Congo, Laos, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Iran, Equatorial Guinea, Saudi Arabia, Central African Republic, Myanmar, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Chad, North Korea.
Excertos do relatório
Democracy in retreat
This is the third edition of the Economist Intelligence Unit’s democracy index. It reflects the
situation as of November 2010. The first edition, published in The Economist’s The World in 2007,
measured the state of democracy in September 2006 and the second edition covered the situation
towards the end of 2008. The index provides a snapshot of the state of democracy worldwide for
165 independent states and two territories—this covers almost the entire population of the world
and the vast majority of the world’s independent states (micro states are excluded). The Economist
Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy is based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism;
civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture.
Countries are placed within one of four types of regimes: full democracies; flawed democracies;
hybrid regimes; and authoritarian regimes.
Free and fair elections and civil liberties are necessary conditions for democracy, but they are
unlikely to be sufficient for a full and consolidated democracy if unaccompanied by transparent
and at least minimally efficient government, sufficient political participation and a supportive
democratic political culture. It is not easy to build a sturdy democracy. Even in long-established
ones, if not nurtured and protected, democracy can corrode.
Democracy in decline
The global record in democratisation since the start of its so-called third wave in 1974, and
acceleration after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, has been impressive. According to the
Economist Intelligence Unit’s measure of democracy, one-half of the world’s population now lives
in a democracy of some sort. However, there has been a decline in democracy across the world since
2008. The decades-long global trend in democratisation had previously come to a halt in what
Larry Diamond (2008) called a “democratic recession”. Now democracy is in retreat. The dominant
pattern in all regions over the past two years has been backsliding on previously attained progress
in democratisation. The global financial crisis that started in 2008 accentuated some existing
negative trends in political development.
Disappointments abound across many of the world’s regions. Authoritarian trends have become
even more entrenched in the Middle East and much of the former Soviet Union. Democratisation
in Sub-Saharan Africa is grinding to a halt, and in some cases is being reversed. A political malaise
in east-central Europe has led to disappointment and questioning of the strength of the region’s
democratic transition. Media freedoms are being eroded across Latin America and populist forces
with dubious democratic credentials have come to the fore in a few countries in the region. In the
developed West, a precipitous decline in political participation, weaknesses in the functioning of
government and security-related curbs on civil liberties are having a corrosive effect on some longestablished democracies.
Reversals in or erosion of democracy and rising disenchantment with the results of some political
liberalisations appear to have a variety of causes. The pace of democratisation was bound to slow
after the “easy cases”—eager-to-liberalise east-central Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall and
African regimes susceptible to outside pressure for political change. “Hard cases” such as China and
Middle East autocracies were always going to be a more difficult proposition. Autocrats have also
learned how better to protect themselves; many of them preside over energy-rich states and have
been strengthened by sustained high oil prices. A key factor is the delegitimation of much of the
democracy-promotion agenda, which has been associated with military intervention and unpopular
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. A combination of double standards in foreign policy (autocrats can
be good friends as well as foes) and growing infringements of civil liberties has led to charges of
hypocrisy against Western states.
Problems in the functioning of democracy in leading Western states diminish the scope
for credible external democracy promotion. The US and UK are near the bottom of the “full
democracy” category in our index. In the US, there has been an erosion of civil liberties related
to the fight against terrorism. Problems in the functioning of government have also become more
prominent. In the UK, there has also been some erosion of civil liberties, but the main feature
is an exceptionally low level of political participation across all dimensions—voting turnout,
membership of political parties and willingness to engage in and attitudes to political activity.
Although almost one-half of the world’s countries can be considered to be democracies, in
our index the number of “full democracies” is low, at only 26 countries; 53 countries are rated as
“flawed democracies”. Of the remaining 88 countries in our index, 55 are authoritarian and 33 are
considered to be “hybrid regimes”. As could be expected, the developed OECD countries dominate
among full democracies, although there are two Latin American countries, one east European
country and one African country, which suggests that the level of development is not a binding
constraint. Only two Asian countries are represented: Japan and South Korea.
One-half of the world’s population lives in a democracy of some sort, although only 12% reside
in full democracies. Some 2.5bn people, more than one-third of the world’s population, still lives
under authoritarian rule (with a large share being, of course, in China).
Looking at the regional distribution of regime types, flawed democracies are concentrated in
Latin America and eastern Europe, and to a lesser extent in Asia. Despite progress in Latin American
democratisation in recent decades, many countries in the region remain fragile democracies. Levels
of political participation are generally low and democratic cultures are weak. There has also been
significant backsliding in recent years in some areas such as media freedoms.
Much of eastern Europe illustrates the difference between formal and substantive democracy.
The new EU members from the region have pretty much equal levels of political freedoms and civil
liberties as the old developed EU, but lag significantly in political participation and political culture—a
reflection of widespread anomie and weaknesses of democratic development. Only one country from
the region, the Czech Republic, is rated a full democracy.
Changes between 2008 and 2010
Many of the world’s authoritarian regimes are in the Middle East and North Africa (although there is
also a fair number in Asia, the former Soviet Union and Sub-Saharan Africa). The dearth of democratic
regimes in the Middle East and North Africa is a well-known phenomenon, with much debate about
the causes. In the statistical relationship between democracy and income discussed below, a dummy
variable for the Middle East and North Africa is negative and highly significant statistically even when
oil wealth is included in our 167-country sample—that is, the Middle East and North Africa has much
lower levels of democratisation than could be inferred on the basis of income levels.
The rollback in democracy is also part of an underlying trend that has been evident for some time,
but has strengthened. Between 2006 (the year of the first issue of the index) and 2008 there was
stagnation; over the past two years, between 2008 and 2010, there has been outright decline. In all
regions, the average democracy score for 2010 is lower than in 2008. The democracy score was lower
in 2010 than in 2008 in 91 countries out of the 167 covered by the Index, although in the majority of
these the deterioration was modest. The score increased, at least marginally, in 48 countries, and it
stayed the same in 28 countries over this period. The most pronounced decline was in eastern Europe.
In 19 countries of eastern Europe, the democracy score declined between 2008 and 2010.
In 13 countries there was a change in regime type between 2008 and 2010; in 11 of these
there was regression. France, Italy, Greece and Slovenia dropped from the category of full
democracies to flawed democracies. In addition to these four European countries that
regressed from full to flawed democracies, three countries moved from flawed to hybrid
regimes and four from hybrid to authoritarian regimes. Only in two cases, both in SubSaharan Africa, was there an advance—Ghana and Mali moved from hybrid regimes to flawed
A noticeable decline in media freedoms in recent years, affecting all regions to some extent,
has accelerated since 2008. This has affected mainly electronic media, which is often under state control or heavy state influence—although repression and infringements of the freedom of
expression have also extended to the print media and, most recently, the Internet.
In 36 countries there was a deterioration in scores for media freedom between 2008 and 2010.
This included three countries in western Europe (France, Italy, Turkey), eight in eastern Europe
(Albania, Azerbaijan, Hungary, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Russia and Serbia), nine in Latin
America (Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Mexico, Honduras, Nicaragua and Peru),
four in the Middle East and North Africa (Iran, Egypt, Palestinian Territories and Saudi Arabia),
four in Asia &Australasia (Fiji, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Thailand), and eight in Sub-Saharan Africa
(Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Congo Brazzaville, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea,
Madagascar and Rwanda).
The reasons for this decline are complex and varied. Underlying negative trends appear to have
been exacerbated by the post-2008 economic crisis. Many governments have felt increasingly
vulnerable and threatened and have reacted by intensifying their efforts to control the media and
impede free expression. Increasing unemployment and job insecurity have fostered a climate of fear
and self-censorship among journalists in many countries. The concentration of media ownership
has tended to increase, which has had a negative impact on the diversity of views and the freedom
of expression. Advanced nations have become more inward-looking and hence less interested and
capable of monitoring and pressurising emerging market governments to ensure freedom of the
press. In authoritarian regimes, which have often become stronger and more confident, state control
and repression of any independent media is a given and has if anything tended to get worse, with
increasing attacks on independent journalists.
Democracy and development
The relationship between the level of development (income per head) and democracy is not clear
cut. There is an apparent association: the simple correlation between our democracy index for
2010 and the logarithm of GDP per head (at PPP US$) in 2010 is just under 0.6. This may look
even surprisingly low—it implies that in a simple two-variable regression of the democracy index
on income per head, just one-third of the inter-country variation in democracy is explained by
income levels. If we also include a measure of oil wealth (with a so-called dummy variable that
takes a value of 1 for major oil-exporting countries and 0 otherwise), the explanatory power of
the regression increases sharply to some 60% of the inter-country variation in the democracy
index. Although this still leaves almost 40% of the variation unexplained, it illustrates the oftenobserved strong negative impact on democratic development of a reliance on oil wealth.
However, the direction of causality between democracy and income is also debatable. The
standard modernisation hypothesis that economic development leads to, and/or is a necessary
pre-condition for democracy, is no longer universally accepted. Instead, it has been argued that
the primary direction of causation runs from democracy to income (Rigobon and Rodrik 2005;
Acemoglu et al 2005).
Democracy after the financial crisis
There are a number of ways in which democracy has been adversely affected by the economic and
financial crisis.There has been a decline in some aspects of governance, political participation
and media freedoms, and a clear deterioration in attitudes associated with, or are conducive to,
democracy in many countries, including in Europe. The financial and economic crisis has increased
the attractiveness of the Chinese model of authoritarian capitalism for some emerging markets.
Democracy promotion by the Western world was already discredited by the experience in the
Middle East in recent years. The economic crisis has undermined further the credibility of efforts
by developed nations to promote their values abroad.
Nations with a weak democratic tradition are by default vulnerable to setbacks. Many nonconsolidated democracies are fragile and socioeconomic stress has led to backsliding on
democracy in many countries. The underlying shallowness of democratic cultures—as revealed
by disturbingly low scores for many countries in our index for political participation and political
culture—has come to the fore.
The impact of the economic and financial crisis on political trends has been most marked in
Europe, both east and west. Although extremist political forces in Europe have not profited from the economic crisis as much as might have been feared, populism and anti-immigrant sentiment
has nevertheless been on the rise. This trend has interacted with concerns about terrorism and
led to some further erosion of civil liberties.
Drawing on the results of worldwide Gallup polls, the International Labour Organisation (ILO)
recently noted that since the start of the crisis in 2008 confidence in government has declined
perceptibly in many countries, as have perceptions that policies are fair or lead to a better future
(ILO, 2010). These trends are most common among advanced economies. Among west European
countries, there is a perception of growing political extremism and social discontent. Perceptions
of unfairness have increased in Latin America and remain high in Asia and, to a lesser extent, in
Sub-Saharan Africa. Among advanced countries, confidence in government declined from 52% in
2006 to 41% in 2009. In countries of eastern Europe, confidence in government was down to 38%
in 2009 from 43% in 2006 (ILO op cit, page 33).
The results of the Gallup polls are largely mirrored by the findings of Eurobarometer surveys.
Confidence in national pubic institutions in western Europe—already low before 2008 in many
countries—has declined further since the onset of the crisis. Less than one fifth of west Europeans
trust political parties and only about one third trust their governments and parliaments. Levels
of public trust are exceptionally low in the eastern Europe-12 (the 10 new EU member states
and EU candidate countries Croatia and Macedonia). Less than 10% of people in this subregion
trust political parties and less than one fifth trust their governments and their parliaments. The
proportion that is satisfied with the way democracy functions in their countries fell from 40% in
2007 to only 33% in 2009.
Economic crises can threaten democracy, usually with a lag, through increased social unrest.
So far, social unrest related to the financial and economic crisis has affected about two dozen
countries, mostly in Europe. These cases have taken the form of protest against governments’
crisis responses and austerity measures aimed at improving fiscal balances, and violent clashes
between the government and demonstrators. Historically, economic crises and difficulties
have been associated with democratic breakthroughs, such as the sudden collapse of seemingly
stable autocratic regimes, as much as with the opposite outcome of increasing authoritarianism.
However, in the current circumstances, and given the combination of other factors at work, it
seems much more likely that the negative impact on democratisation would predominate.
When economic liberalism is curtailed, as it has been since the crisis broke out, social and
political liberalism also tend to be affected. There is a well-known association between economic
freedom and political freedom, and more broadly democracy. There are 152 countries for which
data are available for both our democracy index and the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom (IEF). The simple correlation between the two measures is almost 0.7. The component
indexes of the IEF are highly inter-correlated. Thus the scope for drawing reliable inferences
about the separate effects of particular subcomponents of economic freedom may be limited.
Nevertheless, several component indicators of the IEF are of special interest in the present
context—that of the government’s role in the economy as measured by the share of public
spending in GDP and indicators of government regulation.
As expected, the size of government is positively associated with democracy, even when we
control for the level of income per head. Popular demand for more public services is more likely
to be satisfied in democracies. Thus there may not be any reason for concern because of bigger
government or higher state spending levels. However, democracy is negatively associated with
levels of government regulation in various fields, including, interestingly, the degree of financial
sector regulation—also when income levels are controlled for. The same applies to an even
greater extent to regulation of business, trade and capital flows (although not to labour market
regulation, in which democracies appear likely to engage). A rise in economic nationalism, in
particular, clearly seems to be associated with less democracy.
Major reversals have taken place before—a democratisation wave after the second world war
ended with more than 20 countries subsequently sliding back to authoritarianism. That sort
of rollback is not currently evident, but the threat of backsliding now greatly outweighs the
possibility of further gains. Democracy as a value retains strong universal appeal worldwide.
Despite setbacks and overall stagnation, surveys show that most people in most places still want
democracy. Creating democracy by external intervention is being discredited. But trends such as
globalisation, increasing education and expanding middle classes would have tended to favour the
organic development of democracy. These underlying forces, even if developing at a slower pace
than in the recent past, suggest that the retreat from democracy will not be permanent.
Defining and measuring democracy
There is no consensus on how to measure democracy, definitions of democracy are contested and
there is an ongoing lively debate on the subject. The issue is not only of academic interest. For
example, although democracy-promotion is high on the list of US foreign policy priorities, there
is no consensus within the US government on what constitutes a democracy. As one observer
recently put it, “the world’s only superpower is rhetorically and militarily promoting a political
system that remains undefined--and it is staking its credibility and treasure on that pursuit”
(Horowitz, 2006, p 114).
Although the terms freedom and democracy are often used interchangeably, the two are not
synonymous. Democracy can be seen as a set of practices and principles that institutionalise and
thus ultimately protect freedom. Even if a consensus on precise definitions has proved elusive,
most observers today would agree that, at a minimum, the fundamental features of a democracy
include government based on majority rule and the consent of the governed, the existence of free
and fair elections, the protection of minority rights and respect for basic human rights. Democracy
presupposes equality before the law, due process and political pluralism. A question arises whether
reference to these basic features is sufficient for a satisfactory concept of democracy. As discussed
below, there is a question of how far the definition may need to be widened.
Some insist that democracy is necessarily a dichotomous concept—a state is either democratic
or not. But most measures now appear to adhere to a continuous concept, with the possibility of
varying degrees of democracy. At present, the best-known measure is produced by the US-based
Freedom House organisation. The average of their indexes, on a 1 to 7 scale, of political freedom
(based on 10 indicators) and of civil liberties (based on 15 indicators) is often taken to be a
measure of democracy.
The index is available for all countries, and stretches back to the early 1970s. It has been used
heavily in empirical investigations of the relationship between democracy and various economic
and social variables. The so-called Polity Project provides, for a smaller number of countries,
measures of democracy and regime types, based on rather minimalist definitions, stretching back
to the 19th century. These have also been used in empirical work.
Freedom House also measures a narrower concept, that of “electoral democracy”. Democracies
in this minimal sense share at least one common, essential characteristic. Positions of political
power are filled through regular, free, and fair elections between competing parties, and it is
possible for an incumbent government to be turned out of office through elections. Freedom House
criteria for an electoral democracy include:
1) A competitive, multiparty political system
2) Universal adult suffrage
3) Regularly contested elections conducted on the basis of secret ballots, reasonable ballot
security and the absence of massive voter fraud
4) Significant public access of major political parties to the electorate through the media and through generally open political campaigning
The Freedom House definition of political freedom is somewhat (though not much) more
demanding than its criteria for electoral democracy—that is, it classifies more countries as
electoral democracies than as “free” (some “partly free” countries are also categorised as
“electoral democracies”). At the end of 2007, 121 out of 193 states were classified as “electoral
democracies; of these, on a more stringent criterion, 90 states were classified as “free”. The
Freedom House political freedom measure covers the electoral process and political pluralism and,
to a lesser extent the functioning of government and a few aspects of participation.
A key difference in measures is between “thin”, or minimalist, and “thick”, or wider concepts of
democracy (Coppedge, 2005). The thin concepts correspond closely to an immensely influential
academic definition of democracy, that of Dahl’s concept of polyarchy (Dahl, 1070). Polyarchy has
eight components, or institutional requirements: almost all adult citizens have the right to vote;
almost all adult citizens are eligible for public office; political leaders have the right to compete
for votes; elections are free and fair; all citizens are free to form and join political parties and other
organisations; all citizens are free to express themselves on all political issues; diverse sources
of information about politics exist and are protected by law; and government policies depend on
votes and other expressions of preference.
The Freedom House electoral democracy measure is a thin concept. Their measure of democracy
based on political rights and civil liberties is “thicker” than the measure of “electoral democracy”.
Other definitions of democracy have broadened to include aspects of society and political culture
in democratic societies.
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s index of democracy, on a 0 to 10 scale, is based on the ratings
for 60 indicators grouped in five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the
functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. Each category has a
rating on a 0 to 10 scale, and the overall index of democracy is the simple average of the five
The category indexes are based on the sum of the indicator scores in the category, converted
to a 0 to 10 scale. Adjustments to the category scores are made if countries do not score a 1 in
the following critical areas for democracy:
1. whether national elections are free and fair
2. the security of voters
3. the influence of foreign powers on government
4. the capability of the civil service to implement policies.
If the scores for the first three questions are 0 (or 0.5), one point (0.5 point) is deducted from
the index in the relevant category (either the electoral process and pluralism or the functioning
of government). If the score for 4 is 0, one point is deducted from the functioning of government
The index values are used to place countries within one of four types of regimes:
1. Full democracies--scores of 8-10
2. Flawed democracies--score of 6 to 7.9
3. Hybrid regimes--scores of 4 to 5.9
4 Authoritarian regimes--scores below 4
Threshold points for regime types depend on overall scores that are rounded to one decimal
Full democracies: Countries in which not only basic political freedoms and civil liberties are
respected, but these will also tend to be underpinned by a political culture conducive to the
flourishing of democracy. The functioning of government is satisfactory. Media are independent
and diverse. There is an effective system of checks and balances. The judiciary is independent
and judicial decisions are enforced. There are only limited problems in the functioning of
Flawed democracies: These countries also have free and fair elections and even if there are
problems (such as infringements on media freedom), basic civil liberties will be respected.
However, there are significant weaknesses in other aspects of democracy, including problems in
governance, an underdeveloped political culture and low levels of political participation.
Hybrid regimes: Elections have substantial irregularities that often prevent them from being
both free and fair. Government pressure on opposition parties and candidates may be common.
Serious weaknesses are more prevalent than in flawed democracies--in political culture,
functioning of government and political participation. Corruption tends to be widespread and the rule of law is weak. Civil society is weak. Typically there is harassment of and pressure on
journalists, and the judiciary is not independent.
Authoritarian regimes: In these states political pluralism is absent or heavily circumscribed.
Many countries in this category are outright dictatorships. Some formal institutions of democracy
may exist, but these have little substance. Elections, if they do occur, are not free and fair. There
is disregard for abuses and infringements of civil liberties. Media are typically state-owned
or controlled by groups connected to the ruling regime. There is repression of criticism of the
government and pervasive censorship. There is no independent judiciary.
Leia a íntegra abaixo: